Home  |   Contact Us

Title Investors Information Sharing with Firms in Oligopoly
Author Myeonghwan Cho (University of Seoul)
Volume 35 Number 2
Pages 439-469 
Keywords Oligopoly, Cournot Competition, Information Asymmetry, Information Transmission
Abstract We study the incentives for an investor to transmit information to its invested firms in an
oligopoly. The investor has more information on market conditions than the firms and
reveals it publicly or privately before the firms produce the goods. When the investor uses a
public channel to transmit information, the investor does not reveal any of its information
to the firms. When the investor uses a private channel to transmit information, it partially
reveals such a private information to the firm. Indeed, this is possible only when the investor
invests relatively more in one firm than in another firm.
File KER-20190701-35-2-07.pdf
28, Saemunan-ro 5ga-gil, GwanghwamunPlatinum Bldg., 5th F510 Jongno-gu, Seoul, 110-052, Korea
Phone: +82-2-3210-2522~2523 | Fax: +82-2-3210-2555 | E-mail: kea1952@kea.ne.kr
Copyright (c) 2012 KER. All rights reserved.